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Abstract: Aristotle is clear that first principles are not to be established by demonstration, but 
much less clear about how else we might come to understand them. A series of striking parallels 
between his Topics and Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist show that Aristotle was familiar with a 
distinct Platonic method developed for this very purpose. The method does not provide a 
demonstrative guarantee, but it does offer a synoptic view of the consequences for each of an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of candidate principles. I argue that Aristotle not only recognizes 
this method and its application to the problem of first principles in the Topics, but also employs a 
version of the method when discussing first principles in his Metaphysics. Furthermore, I show 
how, despite appearances to the contrary, this method complements what Aristotle has to say 
about first principles in the Analytics. 
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How does one inquire into the truth of first principles? Where does one begin when deciding 
where to begin? Aristotle recognizes a series of difficulties when it comes to understanding the 
starting points of a scientific or philosophical system, and contemporary scholars have 
encountered their own difficulties in understanding Aristotle’s response. I will argue that 
Aristotle was aware of a Platonic solution that can help us uncover his own attitude towards the 
problem. 
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 Aristotle’s central problem with first principles arises from the fact that they cannot be 
demonstrated in the same way as other propositions. Since demonstrations proceed from prior 
and better-known principles, if the principles themselves were in need of demonstration there 
would be a vicious regress: the principles of each ‘higher’ demonstration would then be in need 
of demonstration as well (Met. Γ4, 1006a5–9; APo. I.3). And even if the regress were not a 
vicious one, they would not be genuine first principles if other principles were prior to them 
(APo. I.2). 
 It is controversial where, if anywhere in the Aristotelian corpus, we are to find Aristotle’s 
answer to this problem. Some have looked to Posterior Analytics II.19 where Aristotle gives a 
few clues. While first principles do need to be better known (γνωριµώτερα) than what is 
demonstrated on their basis, the type of knowledge we have of first principles is not the same. 
We acquire scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) through demonstration, but we have a superior type 
of understanding (νοῦς) of first principles. Yet this pushes the question back one step further: 
how exactly does this understanding come about? Is it by mere intuition, or is there some other 
philosophical skill that will help? Others have looked elsewhere in the Analytics or in the Topics 
for Aristotle’s answer. But this raises a further problem: since Aristotle appears to be talking 
about different methods in each case, syllogistic and dialectic respectively, how are the two to be 
reconciled? What is Aristotle’s considered view on the proper argumentative tools for coming to 
know first principles? 
In this paper, I will focus on some intriguing evidence from the Topics that suggests that 
there is indeed a philosophical method beyond mere intuition that can lead us towards the 
principles. Aristotle shows familiarity with a method that Plato developed in response to similar 
problems and employs a version of it in his own inquiry. Thus, it is closely related to Platonic 
and Aristotelian dialectic more broadly, but is a unique application to the problem of first 
principles. The central insight will be that understanding first principles involves not only seeing 
how the principles in question explain what they need to explain, but also seeing why other 
candidate principles cannot adequately do this job. It is a method with both syllogistic and 
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dialectical elements that, while most explicitly described in the Topics, complements the 
discussion of the Analytics as well. 
The method I have in mind I will call ‘exploring both sides.’ It involves identifying an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of candidate principles (the simple case being two contradictories) 
and considering each with an eye towards which one obtains. Plato introduces the method most 
explicitly in the Parmenides, where he has the character Parmenides recommend positing a 
hypothesis, exploring the consequences, then exploring the consequences of the contradictory 
hypothesis as well (135d7–136a2). Parmenides then gives a lengthy display of this very method, 
exploring the consequences of both the hypothesis ‘there is one’ and ‘there is not one’ in turn 
(136e5–166c5). The method does not provide a demonstrative guarantee, but it does offer a 
synoptic view of the reasons for going with one over another. Vassilis Karasmanis has recently 
argued that Plato develops this method specifically for testing first principles.1 This method is 
distinct from Plato’s canonical ‘method of hypothesis’ from the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic: 
that method essentially involves the “vertical” step of positing a higher hypothesis from which 
the thesis in question can be derived. When it comes to first principles, however, there is 
nowhere higher “up” to go; instead, the “horizontal” step of looking to the contradictory is more 
appropriate. I will argue that Aristotle recognizes a similar application of exploring both sides 
that helps resolve the puzzles about understanding first principles. 
As described above, any application of exploring both sides will involve: 
 
<ext> 
(a) a set of what are at least taken to be2 exclusive and exhaustive alternatives 
(b) an independent consideration of each alternative 
(c) an aim of seeing which alternative obtains 
</ext> 
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In the best-case scenario one side will have positive consequences while the other has negative 
or problematic ones; it is then clear that we should accept the former and reject the latter. For 
example, in the Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor sets out three exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: 
either all kinds combine with one another, no kinds combine, or some do and others do not 
(251c8–e7). The interlocutors go on to find serious problems with the first two alternatives but 
positive results from the third that resolve their previous difficulties.3 The method can also be 
used in an aporetic context for encouraging further inquiry, as happens in the Parmenides. 
Parmenides raises several serious problems for Socrates’ theory of forms in the first half of the 
dialogue; Socrates is about ready to give up until Parmenides shows that there are also serious 
problems for someone who denies the existence of forms (135b5–c2). The dialogue ends with 
another aporia for Parmenides’ thesis ‘there is one’ to similar effect. 
 The method is particularly useful for discussing first principles. When dealing with such 
principles there are no prior theses from which to derive them deductively. Therefore, beyond 
just looking at the consequences of a given candidate principle, it is useful to look to its 
alternatives and see whether those can positively be ruled out. I will argue that Aristotle is aware 
of this method along with its usefulness for discussing first principles in the Topics and that this 
insight complements his discussion of syllogistic in the Analytics. I will also suggest that the 
Metaphysics supplies at least one clear example of a work where Aristotle himself employs the 
method with his own adjustments. Both Plato and Aristotle realize the importance of 
comprehensively understanding the explanatory virtues of the correct principles and the 
explanatory shortcomings of the incorrect ones. Yet where Plato requires repeated application of 
this method for an extensive set of candidate principles, Aristotle uses the same methodology on 
claims about the principles to narrow down those candidates in the first place. 
 
 
1. Platonic Parallels in Topics VIII.14 
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The parallels between what Aristotle says in Topics VIII.14 and what Plato recommends at 
Parmenides 135d7–136a2 are striking. A survey of these parallels will suggest that, at the very 
least, Aristotle was aware of this aspect of Plato’s method. In light of even further parallels in 
Topics I.2, I will suggest that Aristotle recognized not only the structure of exploring both sides 
but also its usefulness for testing first principles.  
Aristotle begins this final chapter of the Topics by recommending several strategies for 
practice in dialectical argumentation. He suggests converting arguments (that is, negating the 
conclusion of an argument and using it to prove the negation of one of the initial premises), 
setting out attacks both for a thesis and for its contradictory, and examining different lines of 
attack for each one. He then adds the following: 
 
<ext> 
And for accurate recognition and philosophic wisdom, the ability to comprehensively see, or to 
have comprehensively seen, what follows from each hypothesis is no small tool; for it remains to 
choose one of the two correctly. (Top. 163b9–12)4 
 
πρός τε γνῶσιν καὶ τὴν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν φρόνησιν τὸ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν καὶ συνεωρακέναι τὰ 
ἀφ’ ἑκατέρας συµβαίνοντα τῆς ὑποθέσεως οὐ µικρὸν ὄργανον· λοιπὸν γὰρ τούτων ὀρθῶς 
ἑλέσθαι θάτερον. 
</ext> 
 
This is immediately reminiscent of the recommendation of exploring both sides in the 
Parmenides. The language is strikingly similar. Aristotle describes looking to the consequences 
of each hypothesis using the same words for ‘consequences’ (συµβαίνοντα) and ‘hypothesis’ 
(ὑπόθεσις) as Plato in his recommendation “to examine the consequences of the hypothesis when 
hypothesizing if each thing is, but also to hypothesize if the same thing is not” (Parmenides 
135e9–136a2).5 Both passages clearly invoke philosophy,6 and emphasize the importance of the 
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task at hand.7 Furthermore, Aristotle uses a word that evokes the Platonic context when he 
describes the ability to “comprehensively see” (συνοράω) the consequences on either side.8 
 Plato suggests that this type of comprehensive vision is a requirement for prospective 
philosophers; they need to make systematic connections among the different types of study as 
well as the underlying realities. He has Socrates summarize the point as follows: “the one who 
can comprehensively see is dialectical, the one who cannot isn’t” (Republic VII, 537c7). 
Aristotle consistently uses this same verb to indicate the same type of comprehensive vision in 
other passages. He uses it at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics to refer to the understanding that 
will result from a comprehensive survey of different political systems (referring, of course, to the 
Politics).9 He also uses the verb to describe what can be seen or inferred based on a large number 
of observations of specific cases10 or even all cases.11 The term also appears repeatedly in the 
context of first principles.12 
But given these linguistic parallels, is Aristotle really talking about the same method 
here? Does what he describes fit the criteria for exploring both sides mentioned above? The 
context makes clear that it does. Leading up to this point Aristotle explicitly recommends 
looking at both a hypothesis and its contradictory: “and for all theses, both that it is thus and that 
it is not thus, one must examine the attack” (163a36–b1). This shows that what Aristotle has in 
mind meets the first two criteria for exploring both sides: it involves (a) what are taken to be 
exclusive and exhaustive alternatives and (b) an independent consideration of each. One might 
doubt, however, whether it really meets condition (c). After all, Aristotle begins the passage by 
specifying that the following recommendations are “for exercise and practice in these sorts of 
arguments” (163a29–30). One might reasonably see the aim here as merely equipping oneself to 
win a dialectical debate, not seeing which side is true. 
While it may be true that Aristotle’s initial point is simply about training for dialectical 
debate more broadly, when he transitions to talking about “philosophic wisdom” he is 
recommending an additional use for this dialectical practice. Immediately following his point 
about being able to comprehensively see the consequences of each hypothesis he does not 
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mention its use for winning a debate; instead, he stresses how it helps one choose which side is 
correct (see 163b9–12 quoted above). He goes on to make abundantly clear that the aim he has in 
mind is the truth itself: 
 
<ext> 
But there must underlie a disposition well-suited for this sort of thing, that is goodness of 
disposition with respect to truth, the ability to choose the true and avoid the false well, which those 
who are naturally inclined are able to do well. For, judging well what is best, they appropriately 
love and hate what is brought before them. (Top. 163b12–16) 
 
δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν εὐφυᾶ, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα, τὸ δύνασθαι 
καλῶς ἑλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος· ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὖ δύνανται ποιεῖν· εὖ γὰρ 
φιλοῦντες καὶ µισοῦντες τὸ προσφερόµενον εὖ κρίνουσι τὸ βέλτιστον. 
</ext> 
 
Aristotle emphasizes that a disposition well accustomed to and oriented towards the truth is 
necessary for this philosophical use of dialectic. This shows that the third criterion for exploring 
both sides is indeed met. 
But there is another worry in light of the passage just quoted. Perhaps this ability to see 
the truth has nothing to do with the previous recommendation about looking to the consequences 
of two contradictory hypotheses. Perhaps it is simply a matter of inborn talent: those with a 
natural inclination towards the truth will be able to see it, but everyone else will be left in the 
dark. If this is right, then Aristotle may not after all have in mind the same method operative in 
the Platonic context, where the value of exploring both sides is its ability to provide this very 
understanding. This is clear in the Parmenides, where the exercise itself is repeatedly said to be 
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necessary for grasping the truth.13 But Aristotle, too, draws the connection between dialectical 
training and a resultant ability towards the end of the chapter: “ability comes from these things, 
and training is for the sake of ability” (164b1–2). When he talks about being able to see the truth, 
then, he need not have in mind some inborn talent, but rather a disposition developed by the very 
training described here. And this makes good philosophical sense given the details of what 
Aristotle recommends. Examining an attack as well as its resolution14 on either side and 
choosing the best among multiple lines of attack is exactly the sort of training that might help 
one choose the true and avoid the false (163a36–b5).15 
This connection between a type of dialectical exercise and the ability to comprehensively 
see the truth is yet another connection to the Platonic method of exploring both sides. It is 
unlikely to be a mere coincidence that Aristotle is describing the very method that his teacher 
laid out and used for testing candidate first principles. Aristotle does indeed have first principles 
in mind in this chapter, as he mentions them later on.16 In the next section, I will argue that the 
parallels with exploring both sides in Plato are equally clear in another important passage, Topics 
I.2, that makes the connection to first principles even more explicit. 
 
 
2. The Problem of First Principles in Topics I.2 
 
I am not the first one to make this connection to Plato’s Parmenides. Alexander of Aphrodisias 
makes a similar observation in his commentary on a passage in Topics I.2, even quoting directly 
from the Parmenides (On Aristotle’s Topics, 29:3–5). He also refers back to this passage when 
discussing VIII.14, observing how both emphasize that a familiarity with either side of the 
argument enables philosophical understanding (584:6–9).17 Alexander is right to emphasize the 
parallels in Topics I.2 in particular, which are once again quite striking. Furthermore, the 
evidence here reinforces the idea that Aristotle was aware not only of the general usefulness of 
exploring both sides, but also of its application to first principles in particular. 
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The passage begins by listing three uses for the study contained within the Topics: for 
training, for argumentative encounters, and for the “philosophical sciences” (τὰς κατὰ 
φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήµας, 101a27–28).18 He elaborates this third use as follows: 
 
<ext> 
and [it is useful] for the philosophical sciences, because when we are able to go through the 
puzzles for both sides we will clearly see the true and the false in each more easily. (Top. 
101a34–36) 
 
πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήµας, ὅτι δυνάµενοι πρὸς ἀµφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν 
ἑκάστοις κατοψόµεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. 
</ext> 
 
As in Topics VII.14 and the Parmenides, we get a clear invocation of philosophy here. And once 
again he appears to be describing the structure of exploring both sides. Aristotle mentions going 
through the puzzles for “both sides” which, in the context of dialectical debate, are exclusive and 
exhaustive alternatives (a positive claim and its denial). In this way it meets conditions (a) and 
(b). As for condition (c), Aristotle is equally if not more direct in this passage that the aim is a 
thorough vision of the truth.19 The verb he uses to describe this vision, καθοράω, once again 
evokes the Platonic context.20 And this occurs in the context of discussing a certain sort of 
exercise in dialectic (γυµνασία [101a27, 28]) and the capacity that it engenders (δύναµαι 
[101a30, 35], ἀδύνατος [101a38]) as in the other passages discussed so far. 
 For these reasons, Alexander is right to connect these two passages in the Topics with 
each other and with the Platonic method of exploring both sides. As Alexander puts it: “in 
philosophical inquiries as a whole it is impossible to find the truth easily without first trying 
attacks on either side” (28:30–29:2). But I think there is more to be said about the significance of 
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this connection, particularly as it relates to Aristotle’s attitude towards first principles. Just after 
highlighting the philosophical use for dialectic, he adds the following: 
 
<ext> 
and even further [it is useful for] the first things of those that concern each science. For, since the 
principles are prior to everything, it is impossible to say anything about internal principles that 
accord with a given science based on those very principles, but it is necessary to go through them 
through the reputable opinions concerning each. This is peculiar or most appropriate to dialectic; 
for, since it is capable of examining the principles of all systems, it has a path towards them. 
(Top. 101a36–b4) 
 
ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήµην. ἐκ µὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν 
προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήµην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ 
ἁπάντων εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ’ ἴδιον ἢ 
µάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν µεθόδων 
ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει. 
</ext> 
 
The interpretation of this passage is controversial. When read in the broader context that I have 
argued for so far, however, it suggests Aristotle’s familiarity with the Platonic solution to the 
problem of first principles. 
 Before going into greater detail, it is worth first reminding ourselves about what Aristotle 
has to say about first principles elsewhere. He distinguishes between different types of principles 
in Posterior Analytics I.2. He uses ‘principle’ (ἀρχή) and ‘first thing’ (πρῶτον) to describe the 
general category of first principles.21 Such a principle must be first in the order of explanation 
(not necessarily in the order of discovery), without a middle term,22 better known, prior to, and 
explanatory of that which is concluded from it (71b21–22). These can then be divided into what 
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he calls an ‘axiom’ (ἀξίωµα), a necessary prerequisite for any learning, and what he calls a 
‘thesis’ (θέσις), which is not such a general prerequisite (rather, it will be restricted to a specific 
science). The latter is then divided further into what he calls ‘hypotheses’ and ‘definitions.’ A 
hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) posits the existence or nonexistence of something (just as, for instance, 
Plato has his character Parmenides hypothesize ‘there is one’ and ‘there is not one’ 
alternatively). A definition (ὁρισµός), on the other hand, does not make such a posit: it says what 
something is rather than positing that it is (72a14–24). 
 Robin Smith has given a deflationary reading of this passage where the connection 
between the method Aristotle is discussing and first principles is tenuous at best.23 He is 
responding to previous interpretations, primarily that of Terence Irwin in his book Aristotle’s 
First Principles, which suggest that Aristotle sees dialectic as having the ability to establish first 
principles. According to Smith, dialectic does not have the power to establish anything, let alone 
first principles; all this passage says is that dialectic, unlike the specific sciences, can discuss the 
general first principles (axioms in the above sense) given its generality. Much comes down to 
what we mean by ‘establish.’ I agree that dialectic is not a demonstrative science and thereby 
does not have the ability to establish any conclusions demonstratively. But Smith goes too far in 
positing no special relationship between dialectical skill and an understanding of first principles. 
Properly understood, the passage does suggest that at least one use of this dialectical skill is 
inquiring into first principles through exploring both sides, just as Plato recognizes. And while 
exploring both sides does not establish first principles demonstratively or provide an unshakeable 
proof, it does bring about the type of robust and systematic understanding necessary for first 
principles.  
 Smith motivates his deflationary reading of the relationship between dialectic and first 
principles as described here in Topics I.2 with a unique interpretation of the subject matter of the 
Topics as well as several textual considerations. On Smith’s view, the purpose of the Topics is to 
expound a dialectical art, a manual for succeeding in dialectical arguments, analogous to a 
fencing manual that gives advice on succeeding at fencing (“Uses of Dialectic,” 
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that the I.2 passage is only discussing Aristotelian axioms and emphasizes the art’s ability to 
discuss even these most general principles (“Uses of Dialectic,” 351–54). I will not be taking a 
stance here on Aristotle’s general views about dialectic or on how precisely he would 
characterize the method that I am calling ‘exploring both sides.’ That being said, it is worth 
looking at Smith’s textual considerations to show that the passage need not be read in such a 
deflationary way. The passage is perfectly consistent with, even suggestive of, the idea that the 
skill being discussed is useful for testing candidate principles in all three varieties discussed 
above.  
 Smith points out that there are at least two ways to understand the phrase that I have 
translated “the first things of those that concern each science” (τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην 
ἐπιστήµην). I am understanding the Greek article τῶν as neuter and referring generally to all of 
the propositions that concern a particular science; relatedly, I understand ‘the first things’ to refer 
to theses, that is the principles specific to a given science. Smith suggests that, if this is what 
Aristotle meant, he would have left out the article altogether. Instead, he understands τῶν as 
feminine, referring not just to any proposition but to the principles of a given science. The first of 
those principles, he suggests, are the axioms, the most general principles. Thus, he translates “the 
first ones among the principles about any particular science.” He also understands the phrase that 
I have translated “since the principles are prior to everything” (ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ 
ἁπάντων εἰσί) differently. Smith translates “since the principles of everything are the first 
principles,” and understands the point to be that one cannot derive the general axioms from the 
science-specific theses because the former are first. Yet there is a serious problem with Smith’s 
understanding of both of these phrases: his translations imply that Aristotelian axioms are prior 
to Aristotelian theses. If this were true, then the theses would not count as first principles. While 
the axioms are indeed more general, it would be inconsistent for Aristotle to think that they are 
prior. 
 I take Aristotle’s point here not to be that you cannot derive axioms from theses, but 
rather that you cannot derive first principles from anything since they are meant to be first. To 
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put it differently, when dealing with principles there is nowhere higher “up” to go. But this is 
precisely why it is useful to test those principles by following out their consequences as well as 
the consequences of the contradictory. Because they cannot be demonstrated by something prior, 
exploring both sides provides an alternative method for testing whether or not they are true. And 
this is precisely what Aristotle has been discussing in the surrounding context: the usefulness of 
going through the puzzles on either side for finding the truth. On my view, Aristotle is making 
the point about science-specific principles in particular. It will be especially applicable to 
hypotheses which, by definition, are part of a contradictory pair. 
 Smith also draws attention to the final line of the passage, which he believes has been 
misleadingly translated. Most translators understand the last two words ‘it has a path’ (ὁδὸν ἔχει) 
as governing the phrase ‘in relation to the principles of all systems’ (πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν 
µεθόδων ἀρχὰς). But Smith insists: “it would be amazing for Aristotle to say that dialectic can 
actually establish the indemonstrable first principles on which each science depends and which 
demonstration is powerless to prove” (“Uses of Dialectic,” 353). Instead, he takes the 
prepositional phrase with the point about its being “capable of examining” (ἐξεταστική), and 
understands Aristotle simply to be repeating the point about dialectic’s generality. Thus he 
translates: “since it is examinative with respect to the principles of all disciplines, it has a way to 
do this” (“Uses of Dialectic,” 352). But again, Smith’s deflationary reading is not necessary. He 
is right to point out that dialectic cannot establish first principles, but this need not be how we 
understand the point about its having a “way” or “path” towards them. I have translated the 
prepositional phrase with both points about it being “capable of examining” and “having a path” 
which is less redundant.24 But on any construal my interpretation makes equally good sense of 
Aristotle’s point here. The point is that dialectical skill (as opposed to demonstrative science) 
provides a way of testing (though not establishing) the truth of first principles. And this will give 
us traction for understanding (though not demonstratively proving) which ones we should take to 
be true. We need not take Smith’s well-motivated worry about reading too much into the power 
of dialectic to his deflationary extreme. The method of exploring both sides is truly useful for 
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assessing first principles above and beyond the context of a dialectical bout. Smith admits that 
his interpretation leaves wide open the question of how Aristotle thought we come to understand 
first principles (“Uses of Dialectic,” 355). While exploring both sides cannot demonstratively 
establish any truths, my interpretation has the advantage of explaining how we can come to 
accept one candidate principle over another within the Aristotelian system. Furthermore, we will 
see in section 4 how Aristotle actually employs the method of exploring both sides as part of an 
inquiry into what these first principles are. 
 
 
3. A Conflict with the Analytics? 
 
Up to this point I have focused on the dialectical aspect of exploring both sides and its relevance 
for testing candidate first principles. Looking to both a hypothesis and its contradictory, as one 
does in dialectical practice, is especially useful when one cannot prove demonstratively which 
one is true. But does this mean that Aristotle’s syllogistic has absolutely no role to play in an 
inquiry into first principles? And what are we to make of those passages in the Analytics that 
appear to suggest a different answer to the problem of first principles? A closer look at the 
Analytics will show that the two works are in fact complimentary; the Topics simply fills out 
several important lessons about inquiring into principles not detailed in the Analytics. 
 The topic of first principles is clearly broached in Prior Analytics I.27–30. Here Aristotle 
discusses how one can find the proper premises to construct deductions within a given science. 
This, of course, would include the most fundamental premises of a given science, the science-
specific principles or theses (θέσεις) in the technical sense. Aristotle appears to reference these 
principles in the very first sentence of I.27: 
 
<ext> 
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It now must be said how we will always be well supplied with syllogisms with regard to what is 
set before us, and through what sort of path we will grasp the principles in each case.25 (APr. 
43a20–23) 
 
πῶς δ’ εὐπορήσοµεν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ τιθέµενον ἀεὶ συλλογισµῶν, καὶ διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ ληψόµεθα 
τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, νῦν ἤδη λεκτέον. 
</ext> 
 
What he goes on to discuss in I.27–30 is how, given a set of terms within a given science and the 
facts about their application, we can systematically find the right premises from which to deduce 
those facts as the conclusion. Tuominen helpfully stresses how this is not a method for inquiring 
into any of the relevant facts; instead, it is a procedure to be performed once we already know all 
of the facts in question (“Aristotle’s Theory and Practice,” 143). A systematic application of this 
procedure can even tell us which among them should play the role of science-specific principles 
that are without a middle term, better known than, prior to, and explanatory of the rest. But the 
truth of those principles will already be known even if the proper explanatory relations have not 
yet been recognized.26 
Thus, the procedure of Posterior Analytics I.27–30 addresses a related but distinct 
problem from the one that exploring both sides is geared towards. It tells us how to go about 
identifying which from an already established set of facts can be used as premises to 
demonstrate a given conclusion and ultimately which belong ‘higher up’ or ‘lower down’ in an 
explanatory system. But exploring both sides allows us to test a candidate principle whose truth 
or falsity we do not yet know at a given stage of inquiry. Exploring both sides will be appropriate 
at a prior stage of inquiry, when we might not even know whether some potential subject exists 
or whether some predicate truly applies. By exploring both sides we can test the truth of this 
candidate principle by seeing what follows from it as well as from its contradictory (or from a 
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larger set of exclusive and exhaustive alternatives). This information will of course be relevant 
for the later question of where the principle stands within the context of the science as a whole. 
Both methods are related, however, in that they involve comparing the explanatory power 
of different propositions. And in both cases the truth of at least some other propositions must be 
taken for granted to make any progress. Aristotle makes clear later on in this section of the Prior 
Analytics that this will be the case for coming to know science-specific principles as such: 
 
<ext> 
Both for philosophy and for any art or skill whatsoever, the path is the same for all of them. . . . 
And the majority [of the principles] are peculiar to each individually. For this reason it is 
characteristic of experience to provide the principles in each case, I mean, for example, 
astronomical experience in the case of astronomy (for astronomical demonstrations were found 
once the appearances were sufficiently grasped), and it is similar in the case of whatever other 
sort of art and science. As a result, if the underlying facts are grasped in each case, we will 
already be in a position to make the demonstrations clear. (APr. 46a3–4, 17–24) 
 
Ἡ µὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ 
µάθηµα. . . . ἴδιαι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἱ πλεῖσται. διὸ τὰς µὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐµπειρίας 
ἐστὶ παραδοῦναι, λέγω δ’ οἷον τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν µὲν ἐµπειρίαν τῆς ἀστρολογικῆς ἐπιστήµης 
(ληφθέντων γὰρ ἱκανῶς τῶν φαινοµένων οὕτως εὑρέθησαν αἱ ἀστρολογικαὶ ἀποδείξεις), ὁµοίως 
δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλην ὁποιανοῦν ἔχει τέχνην τε καὶ ἐπιστήµην· ὥστ’ ἐὰν ληφθῇ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ 
ἕκαστον, ἡµέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἑτοίµως ἐµφανίζειν. 
</ext> 
 
This passage shows that Aristotle does indeed have science-specific principles in mind in this 
portion of the analytics. Knowing the underlying facts aides in coming to know the principles; 
the method described through Posterior Analytics I.27–30 would allow one infer how a 
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systematic set of scientific facts are to be explained and thus which ones are to play the role of a 
principle. The same abductive structure will be present in exploring both sides even when all of 
the facts are not yet known. Exploring both sides will still test a candidate principle based in part 
upon other claims that are taken to be true. For instance, the appearance of plurality in the 
physical world around us will be one of the underlying facts with which we test candidate 
principles about the type and number of beings, as Aristotle does in Physics I.2.27 
Yet what Aristotle does not make explicit here, and what is crucial for understanding the 
usefulness of exploring both sides, is that it is sometimes useful to (1) explore candidate 
principles hypothetically and (2) systematically look at a set of exclusive and exhaustive 
alternatives as well, in order to determine which is most likely to be true. Aristotle does not make 
this explicit here simply because he is not talking about the method of exploring both sides; 
again, he is discussing a later stage where all of the underlying facts are already known. But 
nowhere here does he say that we cannot test a candidate principle for truth before this stage. 
This, I have argued, is what Aristotle is discussing in the Topics I.2 and VIII.14 passages. In fact, 
this helps explain why Aristotle explicitly refers back to the Topics just after this passage in the 
very last lines of Prior Analytics I.30: 
 
<ext> 
It has just been said, then, in a general manner, how it is necessary to choose one’s premises; we 
have gone through it in detail in the treatise concerning dialectic. (APr 46a28–30) 
 
Καθόλου µὲν οὖν, ὃν δεῖ τρόπον τὰς προτάσεις ἐκλέγειν, εἴρηται σχεδόν· δι’ ἀκριβείας δὲ 
διεληλύθαµεν ἐν τῇ πραγµατείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν. 
</ext> 
 
The Topics not only discusses finding appropriate premises for arguments (in this case in a 
dialectical rather than a scientific context), but it also discusses a special use of dialectic for 
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testing the truth of candidate principles, exploring both sides. Smith does not find the reference 
to the Topics plausible and goes as far as to suggest removing these lines as a later interpolation 
in his commentary. Without any other indication of a problem with the text, however, it is best to 
keep it as is; recognizing the context of exploring both sides can help us make better sense of 
why Aristotle would have dialectic and the Topics in mind here. 
 This all goes to show that the discussion in Prior Analytics I.27–30 is distinct from, but 
compatible with, Aristotle’s discussion of exploring both sides in the Topics. The same goes for 
the Posterior Analytics, another context where Aristotle discusses first principles. David 
Bronstein has recently published a helpful study of the book, Aristotle on Knowledge and 
Learning, where he argues that the Posterior Analytics systematically addresses the process of 
coming to a complete scientific understanding, including the discovery of definitions. According 
to Bronstein, Aristotle addresses the process of scientific learning in reverse order, starting with 
the final stages of scientific inquiry in Posterior Analytics I and proceeding to earlier stages in 
Posterior Analytics II. This process of course involves first principles, and Bronstein’s 
interpretation of how we test and ultimately come to understand them is compatible with what 
Aristotle has to say about exploring both sides. But Bronstein’s interpretation also helpfully 
highlights a gap in the Posterior Analytics that exploring both sides can fill, motivating 
Aristotle’s separate discussion in the Topics. 
On Bronstein’s view, scientific inquiry involves first establishing that some subject kind 
exists, discovering its essential attributes and thereby its definition, discovering its demonstrable 
attributes, and finally coming to understand the proper explanation for why each demonstrable 
attribute belongs to that subject kind.28 He argues that we only come to a full understanding of 
the definition at the end of this process, once we see how the essential attributes of the definition 
can be used to demonstrate and thus explain its non-demonstrable attributes.29 This point is 
closely aligned with the idea behind exploring both sides that, when dealing with candidate 
principles, one must test them by looking at their consequences. It is also compatible with the 
suggestion of looking to the consequences of other candidate principles that form an exclusive 
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and exhaustive set, though this point does not feature in the Posterior Analytics as it does in the 
Topics. Thus Aristotle’s discussion of definition in this work at the very least does not conflict 
with, and provides some support for, the picture of exploring both sides in Aristotle that I have 
been defending. Yet even more support comes from what this discussion leaves out. 
Definitions are clearly a central theme in the Posterior Analytics, which Bronstein 
repeatedly highlights by calling them the “most important” principles.30 But they are not the only 
type of principle for Aristotle; Bronstein’s emphasis on definition belies the fact that the 
Posterior Analytics has little to say about the other two categories of first principle, axioms and 
hypotheses. Setting aside the extent to which exploring both sides plays a role in testing 
candidate definitions, I want to stress that exploring both sides is especially applicable to testing 
candidate axioms and hypotheses. The lack of an explicit discussion of exploring both sides and 
of these two types of principle in the Posterior Analytics goes hand in hand. 
 Bronstein himself recognizes this gap in the Analytics. He admits that Aristotle says very 
little about how we come to know the existence of what he calls “primary subject-kinds,” which 
qualify as hypotheses in the technical sense (that is, science-specific principles asserting or 
denying the existence of something).31 But we do get a hint about the importance of examining 
principles hypothetically, an important element of exploring both sides, for both types of science-
specific principle: 
 
<ext> 
In some cases there is some other cause, in others there is not. As a result, it is clear that, in fact, 
some cases of the what-it-is are without a middle term and a principle, in which cases it is 
necessary to hypothesize both that it is and what it is or to make it clear in some other way 
(which the mathematician does; for they hypothesize both what the unit is and that it is). (APo. 
93b21–25) 
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Ἔστι δὲ τῶν µὲν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον, τῶν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ µὲν ἄµεσα 
καὶ ἀρχαί εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστιν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὰ ποιῆσαι (ὅπερ ὁ 
ἀριθµητικὸς ποιεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τί ἐστι τὴν µονάδα ὑποτίθεται, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν). 
</ext> 
 
Despite stressing the importance of doing so, Aristotle does not go into more detail here about 
how to test first principles hypothetically. The Posterior Analytics is more focused on the 
negative point that principles are not straightforwardly demonstrated as other scientific 
propositions are. I have suggested, however, that we can find more positive detail about how we 
inquire into first principles in the Topics. This requires not only exploring the candidate principle 
in question hypothetically, but also doing the same for the rest of a set of exclusive and 
exhaustive alternatives. 
 One other hint about testing principles that is consistent with my understanding of 
exploring both sides comes earlier in the book at Posterior Analytics I.11. There he says that all 
sciences associate with one another when it comes to the common principles (axioms in the 
sense discussed above) and that dialectic in particular can address them given its ability to ask 
genuine questions and not just demonstrate as the other sciences do (77a26–24). This shows that 
dialectic does indeed have a special role to play when it comes to axioms. But the reason that it 
does makes dialectic equally useful for other principles as well: it can keep open the question of 
whether or not a given principle is true as part of a process of inquiry, precisely what one does 
when exploring both sides. Again, there is no indication here that the Analytics is revising or 
replacing the method for testing candidate principles in the Topics. If anything it highlights the 
limitations of demonstration as a one-size-fits-all method and the need for complementary 
methods such as the special use of dialectic discussed in the Topics. 
 Thus we have seen several important gaps in the Analytics that Aristotle’s recognition of 
exploring both sides can help us fill. While, when it comes to first principles, the Analytics has 
the most to say about definitions, it is important to recognize that we need a way of discussing 
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and inquiring into the truth of axioms and hypotheses as well. Exploring both sides is perfectly 
suited for this task. To do so, one must sometimes inquire hypothetically, exploring the 
consequences of a candidate principle without yet firmly asserting or denying its truth. And 
though one cannot simply demonstrate the truth of a principle, it is helpful to explore each of an 
exclusive and exhaustive set of the alternatives to systematically test which one is true. Of 
course, in following out the consequences of each alternative one may in fact construct 
deductions and use underlying scientific facts as part of the basis for inquiry. In this way 
exploring both sides is consistent with the deductive and explanatory tests for definitions 
described in the Analytics. But the process of exploring both sides requires a special use of 
dialectic alongside this scientific methodology, one that is described more fully in the Topics. 
 
 
4. Exploring Both Sides in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
 
So far I have argued that Aristotle shows an awareness of the Platonic method of exploring both 
sides in the Topics and discusses its application for testing first principles in particular. I have 
also suggested that this method is compatible with and in fact complements what Aristotle says 
in the Analytics. It should be no surprise, then, that Aristotle employs the method when 
discussing first principles in his Metaphysics. A systematic survey is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, but a few brief examples will show that Aristotle does in fact employ the very 
method that he recognizes in the Topics. 
 Starting in the first book of the Metaphysics Aristotle is clear that first principles are a 
central topic. He announces that he is after a specific type of knowledge, wisdom, which is 
knowledge about certain types of first principles (Met. Α.1–2, 982a1–5). He then asks what the 
principles are like and how many there are. He begins this investigation with a survey of his 
predecessors in the remainder of Book Α, then lays out several puzzles about these principles in 
Book Β. Unsurprisingly, this puzzle-setting portion of the work employs the structure of 
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exploring both sides. There are also a series of parallels with the texts we have already discussed 
that make these connections even more salient. 
 Rachel Barney has persuasively argued that Aristotle is engaged in a method that harkens 
back to Plato’s Sophist in Metaphysics Α, in particular the discussion of predecessors’ views on 
“how many and of what sort” the fundamental beings are and the so-called ‘Battle between Gods 
and Giants.’32 She also draws an interesting connection between this stage of the inquiry and the 
use of dialectical skill for encounters that Aristotle discusses in Topics I.2.33 Yet the connections 
are even tighter in Metaphysics Β, where I will suggest that we actually see the method of 
exploring both sides employed.34 The first connection to note is the aporetic context; Aristotle 
begins Metaphysics Β by emphasizing the importance of going through the aporiai concerning 
the case at hand (995a24–b4). Aristotle uses the same verb to describe thoroughly going through 
the puzzles as used in Topics I.2 and Plato’s Sophist (διαπορέω [Met. 995a28, 35; Top. 101b35; 
Sophist 250e5]).35 He even mentions puzzles about some of the same principles mentioned in the 
Parmenides and Sophist when he later suggests that one must inquire into “whose job it is to 
theorize about all those things which the dialecticians try to examine, basing their examination 
on reputable opinions only, namely about sameness and difference and similarity and 
dissimilarity and contrariety, and also about the prior and posterior and all such things” (995b21–
25).36 Aristotle also makes clear that he sees himself as following out the consequences of the 
various views discussed, using the very same term for ‘consequences’ (συµβαίνοντα) from the 
Topics and the Platonic context.37 
 Metaphysics Β systematically goes through a series of aporiai that have the structure of 
exploring both sides: a set of what are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, an 
independent consideration of each one, and a focus on which of the alternatives is true. The 
answers to these aporiai are not immediately given, but rather worked out in later books of the 
Metaphysics.38 For now, I would like to point out just two examples that clearly fit the pattern of 
exploring both sides, starting with the very first aporia. Aristotle announces it as follows:  
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<ext> 
The first aporia is the one which we puzzled over in our prefatory remarks, whether it is 
characteristic of one or of more than one science to consider the causes. (Met. 995b4–6) 
 
ἔστι δ’ ἀπορία πρώτη µὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιµιασµένοις διηπορήσαµεν, πότερον µιᾶς ἢ 
πολλῶν ἐπιστηµῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας. 
</ext> 
 
The causes being referred to here are Aristotle’s four canonical causes, considered as 
fundamental causes and principles in Metaphysics Α. It is assumed that there is at least one 
science that studies these causes, the primary candidate being the science of wisdom.39 Based on 
this assumption, there will be either one or more than one science that does so. Thus condition 
(a) of exploring both sides is met: we have what are taken to be an exclusive and exhaustive set 
of alternatives. Aristotle goes on to explore the consequences of each alternative and tentatively 
concludes that the second is most promising. He begins exploring the alternative that there is 
only one science of all the causes but finds problematic consequences (996a20–b1). He then 
turns to the alternative that there is more than one science and the problem of figuring out, if so, 
which of the sciences is the wisdom that they are seeking (996b1–24). He concludes: “it would 
seem that considering each of these causes is characteristic of different sciences” (996b24–26). 
Thus it is clear that conditions (b) and (c) are met as well: each alternative is explored in turn 
with an eye towards which one is true. 
 We see the same pattern of exploring both sides repeated throughout Metaphysics Β. For 
example, Aristotle later asks whether the principles of destructible and indestructible things are 
the same or different:  
 
<ext> 
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A puzzle inferior to none has been overlooked both by people today and by those in the past, 
namely whether the principles of what is destructible and what is indestructible are the same or 
different. (Met. 1000a5–7) 
 
Οὐθενὸς δ’ ἐλάττων ἀπορία παραλέλειπται καὶ τοῖς νῦν καὶ τοῖς πρότερον, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ τῶν 
φθαρτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀρχαί εἰσιν ἢ ἕτεραι. 
</ext> 
 
Once again the alternatives are exclusive and exhaustive (again, on the assumption that there are 
such principles), and Aristotle explores each one with an eye towards which is true. He begins 
with the alternative that the principles are the same, which he takes his predecessors to have 
believed, and finds serious difficulties (1000a7–b22). He then specifies difficulties for the only 
other alternative that the principles are different, leaving us in aporia for the time being 
(1000b22–1001a3). Despite the fact that Aristotle gives less of a hint about which side he will 
end up on in this case, it still meets the criteria for an application of exploring both sides. 
 This is all to say that Aristotle does indeed employ the method of exploring both sides in 
his own work, making it even more likely that the Platonic parallels in the Topics are no mere 
accident. And not only does he use the same structure as Plato, but he also uses it with a similar 
application. In both cases, the method is used to discuss first principles. In both cases, it also sets 
up well-motivated aporiai, with serious difficulties on either side, as a way to encourage further 
inquiry. But there are some interesting differences in Aristotle’s use of the method in the 
Metaphysics as well. Plato used the method for testing candidate first principles, that is taking a 
series of candidate principles (e.g. the existence of one, many, likeness, unlikeness, motion, rest, 
being, and not-being) and exploring their consequences along with the consequences of denying 
their existence. Yet Aristotle is not exploring the consequences of candidate first principles 
themselves in Metaphysics B; instead, he is investigating claims about those principles. He sets 
up an inquiry into them by first exploring what those principles will have to look like (for 
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example, will they be the subject of a science that explores all four types of cause? will they be 
the principles of both what is destructible and what is indestructible?).40 Thus, while Aristotle 
may have recognized and agreed with the importance of exploring both sides in relation to first 
principles, he may have also disagreed with Plato on how to discover those principles. Rather 
than simply trying different principles on for size to see which fits best, Aristotle uses the 
method of exploring both sides to provide a more robust characterization of what they are 
looking for in the first place.41 
 But it is important not to overemphasize this difference in application. Both Plato and 
Aristotle employ the method of exploring both sides as defined by the criteria listed above: an 
independent analysis of each of a set of exclusive and exhaustive alternatives with the aim of 
seeing which one is true. Furthermore, both recognize the use of this method for discussing first 
principles in particular and employ it to this end. The difference comes in how exactly they 
employ the method for finding first principles: Plato recommends an exhaustive strategy of 
testing a range of different candidate principles along with their alternatives, while Aristotle uses 
the method on claims about the principles to narrow down the potential candidates. In both cases 
exploring both sides is not simply a method of display or persuasion, but rather a method of 
discovery: it allows us as inquirers to see not only that a certain candidate appropriately fits the 
role of a first principle, but also why we should accept this principle rather than one of the 
alternatives. 
Now we can finally return to the problem of first principles with which we began. As it 
turns out, emphasizing the importance of exploring both sides enables a natural account of how 
we acquire knowledge of first principles and what that peculiar type of understanding looks like. 
We do not demonstrate the principles, nor is there some innate capacity that automatically 
produces this knowledge. Since these principles are first, there are no prior principles to derive 
them from, but that is consistent with being able to test them by way of their consequences as 
compared with the consequences of the alternatives.42 Aristotle addresses this method explicitly 
in the Topics because of its relation to dialectic, but what he says there is perfectly consistent 
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with and complementary to his focus on definition and on the later stages of inquiry in the 
Analytics. A single application of exploring both sides allows one to test the truth of a candidate 
principle in a way that no demonstrative methodology could. But this alone will not properly test 
the firstness of the candidate principle, something that requires assessing its explanatory power 
in comparison with other candidates beyond a single set of exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. 
Aristotle emphasizes these explanatory considerations in the Analytics, and brings to bear meta-
principles about the first principles in Metaphysics Β for this very reason.43 
Aristotle employs the method of exploring both sides to claims about the principles in 
Metaphysics Β for the same reason they are useful for the principles themselves: there is nothing 
prior to derive these from except for the as yet unestablished principles. As long as those 
principles are unknown, exploring both sides is precisely what is in order. It gives us the capacity 
to see which one is true based on its positive implications as well as the negative implications of 
the alternatives. It is not a demonstrative guarantee of truth, but it is more systematic than a 
single demonstration would be. Thus it makes perfect sense that Aristotle would reserve a unique 
term for this type of understanding (νοῦς [APo. II.19, 100b5–17]). It also makes sense that 
Aristotle would refer to it as a special kind of ability (δύναµις) as he stresses in the Topics 
VIII.14 passage discussed above. We can likely thank Plato for developing this ability for 
exploring both sides in his pupil. At least in this respect, Aristotle appears not to have strayed too 
far from his teacher’s advice.44 
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2 ‘Taken to be’ is an important qualifier here. A fully positive application of the method requires 
that the alternatives are truly exclusive and exhaustive; as a result one will understand why to go 
with one alternative not only for its positive consequences but also for any problematic 
consequences with the other alternatives. But even in cases where the alternatives are not truly 
exclusive and exhaustive, if genuinely taken to be so then the method can still be useful. It can 
create a well-motivated aporia, a situation with problems on either side, that inspires some 
resolution through recognizing missing alternatives or some other mistake in the initial setup. If 
the alternatives are not taken to be exclusive and exhaustive, however, then the results of 
exploring one alternative no longer carry any implications for the other alternatives, a key feature 
of exploring both sides. 
3 In this case it is important that the third option is explored at length and that they are open to 
the possibility that it too could be false (the Visitor explicitly raises this possibility at 259a1–5). 
Otherwise it would be a simple reductio where the third option is taken for granted once 
problems are found with the first two; in that case, it would not meet condition (b) for exploring 
both sides. For further discussion of these passages, see my “New Reading” (forthcoming). 
4 All translations are my own from the most recent Oxford Classical Texts volume in each case. I 
include my own translations to ensure consistency of terminology and to make clear how I am 
construing the original Greek. 
5 The same language is used in the Sophist in the context of exploring both sides as well (see 
237a3, 249b5, and 251d6). 
6 The recommendation in the Parmenides begins with Parmenides asking “What, then, will you 
do about philosophy?” (Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι [135c5]). 
7 The present passage states that it is “no small tool.” The Parmenides describes it as a great task 
(πολὺ ἔργον [127a6, 136d1], ὅσον ἔργον [136d6]) and it even strikes Socrates as an 
“unimaginable affair” (ἀµήχανον πραγµατείαν [136c6]). 
8 Cf. also Plato’s use of the related καθοράω and διοράω in the Parmenides passage (135c7 and 
136c5 respectively). Aristotle himself uses καθοράω in the related Top. 1.2 passage (quoted 
 
 
32 
                                                                                                                                                       
below). Miira Tuominen also points out how Alexander uses συνοράω in his commentary on that 
Top. I.2 passage to describe how dialectic can provide a synoptic understanding of how to solve 
an aporia (“Aristotle’s Theory and Practice,” 151). 
9 EN X.9 1181b21. Cf. Poetics 24 1459b19, On Color 799b20. 
10 Ath. pol. 40.1.5; Col. 796b17; De div. 464b13; EN III.8, 1116b7; GA I.16, 721a17; GC I.2, 
316a5; SE 15, 174a18; and Top. I.17, 108a14. 
11 EN IV.7, 1127a17; Top. I.14, 105b11, I.18, 108b20, VIII.2, 158a4–5. 
12 GC I.1, 314b13, I.2, 316a5; Met. Α.3, 984b2; Phys. I.3 186a32; SE 5, 167a38; Top. I.14, 
105b11, I.18, 108b20, VI.10, 148a42. 
13 Parmenides opens with the following exhortation: “Lift yourself up then and train more by 
what seems to be useless and is called prattle by the Many. [Do this] while you are still young: if 
you don’t, the truth will escape you” (135d3–6). After a detailed description of exploring both 
sides he again stresses that it is necessary “if you, practicing properly, are going to thoroughly 
see the truth” (136c4–5). Zeno underlines the point as well, adding that “without this wandering, 
detailed excursion through all things it is impossible to have understanding while hitting upon 
the truth” (136e1–3). 
14 The Greek word is λύσις (163b1). Gabriela Rossi has persuasively argued for an important 
distinction between refutation (ἔλεγχος) and resolution (λύσις) in Aristotle (“Going through 
Aporiai,” 212–14). She shows that the latter involves analyzing the underlying argument rather 
than simply refuting the thesis is question and that it is a better fit for the philosophical use of 
dialectic discussed in Top. I.2 (see the next section for a discussion of this passage). 
15 There are at least three different interpretations, broadly construed, of what Aristotle might 
have in mind here. The objection relies on the rather extreme idea that the ability to choose the 
true and avoid the false is completely innate and has no relation to the method being discussed. I 
am inclined to think that innate ability has very little role to play here: even though the phrase 
“κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα” might invoke ideas of innate ability, the following appositive phrase “τὸ 
δύνασθαι . . .” suggests to me that throughout Aristotle is thinking of the type of ability that can 
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be developed by training and enabled by having explored both sides. Yet there are of course a 
variety of middling views where some robust innate ability is necessary: perhaps a sort of natural 
cleverness is required to be developed into this ability, or perhaps a knack for the truth is 
necessary in addition to a complementary dialectical ability that analyzes the different 
alternatives in the first place. This appears to be Alexander of Aphrodisias’ view as discussed by 
Tuominen (“Aristotle’s Theory and Practice,” 149–52). These views, too, are perfectly consistent 
with my contention that Aristotle has in mind the method of exploring both sides. 
16 πρώτων θέσεων, 163b18–19; ἀρχάς, 27–28; ἀρχῆς καὶ ὑποθέσεως, 33.  
17 More recently, Rossi and Tuominen have discussed the connection between I.2 and VIII.14 as 
well (Rossi cites a number of others who have observed the connection: “Going through 
Aporiai,” 229n46). Enrico Berti also discusses the connection to Plato’s Parmenides and 
recognizes the importance of looking to both a hypothesis and its contradictory, but does not 
discuss the method in more detail (“Aristote et La Méthode Dialectique Du Parménide de 
Platon,” 342–43). 
18 Alexander plausibly suggests that Aristotle has in mind here the different domains of 
philosophical inquiry. He lists physics, ethics, logic, and metaphysics (On Aristotle’s Topics, 
28:25–27). 
19 My understanding of exploring both sides is consistent with Rossi’s understanding of the 
dialectical resolution of an aporia, thus consistent with her take on this philosophical use of 
dialectic. Rossi sets aside the connection to first principles, however, and leaves out the Platonic 
background which I think lends further insight into the method discussed here (“Going through 
Aporiai,” 211). 
20 This verb is over ten times more frequent in Plato than in Aristotle, with 157 occurrences in 
the Platonic corpus (2.66 occurrences per 10,000 words) and only 21 in Aristotle’s works (0.20 
occurrences per 10,000 words). 
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21 Aristotle goes out of his way to specify that he uses the two terms interchangeably in the 
present context: “I mean the same thing by ‘principle’ and ‘first thing’” (ταὐτὸ γὰρ λέγω πρῶτον 
καὶ ἀρχήν [72a6–7]). 
22 The Greek word here is ἄµεσος. The standard translation, ‘immediate,’ is misleading. It is 
often natural to translate Greek roots into Latin ones, but in this case the English carries 
connotations of being self-evident or intuitively grasped that are not present in the Greek. The 
word literally means “without a middle term” as is clear, for example, from APr. II.19 where he 
recommends making a syllogism ‘without a middle term’ when one wants to hide their strategy 
from an opponent (ἄµεσα, 66a37). Aristotle only uses the term in the Analytics, and it appears to 
be an Aristotelian coinage. 
23 “Uses of Dialectic,” 335–58. 
24 I agree with Smith that taking ἐξεταστικός on its own seems unnatural, though the rarity of the 
word makes it hard to gain much independent traction on its use with πρός. There is precedent 
for taking it with ὁδὸν ἔχει, however. Herodotus speaks of a literal ‘road to the west’ using πρός 
(Historiai II.17 ln15–16: “ἡ δὲ ἑτέρη τῶν ὁδῶν πρὸς ἑσπέρην ἔχει’) and, in the Analytics, 
Aristotle does often use πρός to indicate the proposition being supported by argument (e.g. APr. 
I.43, 50a11). 
25 I have aimed to preserve the ambiguity of the original Greek with my translation “in each 
case” (περὶ ἕκαστον). It could imply its own general subject (Smith, for example, translates “for 
any particular subject”), or it could refer to back to ‘what is set before us’ in the previous clause 
(thus Gisela Striker translates “about each thing”). This is connected to a question about the word 
I have translated ‘principles’ (ἀρχάς), which can also mean ‘starting points’ more generally. 
Striker takes the latter reading, suggesting in her commentary that Aristotle is referring generally 
to the premises of any syllogism as its starting points. Smith, on the other hand, suggests in his 
commentary that Aristotle means principles in the technical sense, more specifically the 
principles that are specific to any given science. Either way, the procedure Aristotle discusses in 
APr. I.27–30 will apply both for principles and for subordinate premises (see below). 
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26 Cf. also Smith’s commentary on 43b1–11 (150). This procedure can help us test for the 
firstness of candidate principles already known to be true (that is, whether or not they are 
appropriate for such a fundamental explanatory role) but is not on its own a method for testing 
their truth. 
27 Cf. Plato’s Sophist where, for example, the presence of νοῦς is an underlying fact used to test 
the change-based ontology of the Giants and the rest-based ontology of the Friends of Forms. 
This is yet another Platonic application of exploring both sides. 
28 See Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning 6–7 for a helpful summary of Bronstein’s view with 
references to where he discusses each stage in greater detail. 
29 Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning chs. 6 (esp. 79), 12, and 13. This is a point that 
Bronstein holds in common with what he calls the “explanationist picture,” a view that he argues 
against in ch. 8. Thus the compatibility with exploring both sides does not depend on Bronstein’s 
more controversial claim that we grasp a preliminary account of the definition before this 
explanatory stage.  
30 Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning, 4, 8, 51–52, 61, 69, 228, and 229. 
31 “It needs to be acknowledged, however, that the manner in which we seek and discover the 
existence of both types of subject-kind . . . is perhaps the least developed aspect of Aristotle’s 
theory of scientific inquiry” (Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning, 188). Bronstein also calls his 
own account of how this process “highly speculative” (Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning, 
171). 
32 “History and Dialectic in Metaphysics Α 3,” 94–95, 99–101. 
33 The idea being that both involve replacing an interlocutor’s view with an improved version 
devised by the questioner (“History and Dialectic in Metaphysics Α 3,” 101). 
34 Rossi also discusses the connection between Top. I.2 and Met. Β, a connection, as she notes, 
that Alexander of Aphrodisias recognizes as well (“Going through Aporiai,” 226). She helpfully 
stresses that giving refutations is usually a way of raising aporiai rather than resolving them, and 
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that a proper resolution will require a more systematic analysis of either side (“Going through 
Aporiai,” 240–45). 
35 For more on the aporetic context of Met. Β and Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist see the 
contributions of Friedemann Buddensiek, Verity Harte and Lesley Brown respectively in The 
Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy edited by Vasilis Politis and George Karamanolis. 
36 Sameness and difference are the first of the so-called ‘greatest kinds’ discussed in the Sophist 
(254d4 and following), and similarity and dissimilarity are two principles that are picked out to 
be examined by the method of exploring both sides in the Parmenides (136b1–5). Aristotle also 
draws heavily on the Parmenides in his discussion of related puzzles in Met. Γ2 as pointed out 
by Stephen Menn in section Iβ2 of his manuscript The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. 
37 As discussed in sect. 1 above. While discussing the view that there are intermediate entities 
between forms and perceptibles, he says, “it would require a longer account to go through all the 
impossible consequences in this case” (τα συµβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα [998a9–10]). 
38 The exact number of aporiai (fourteen by one standard count: see, e.g. 1–2 of the Symposium 
Aristotelicum volume on Met. B), as well as where and how they are answered, is controversial. 
My contention that the book employs the method of exploring both sides, however, will not rely 
on any of these details. 
39 See Met. Α.1–2, 982a1–6, where Aristotle suggests that wisdom is a science of certain causes 
and first principles. 
40 To my knowledge, Aristotle does not, nor do I think he would, characterize these meta-
principles (that is, fundamental claims about the nature of the first principles) as first principles 
themselves. Since these meta-principles should be derivable from the first principles themselves, 
they should be considered as posterior to those principles in the order of explanation. If the first 
principles are instead seen as derivable from these meta-principles, then it is hard to see how the 
former would still qualify as prior and first in the order of explanation. That being said, I do 
think that the truth of these meta-principles is pursued with the goal of discovering what the first 
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principles themselves are. Aristotle himself emphasizes the importance of sometimes looking to 
these meta-principles at the beginning of EN I.8. He ends I.7 by stressing that understanding 
principles is more than half the battle, then goes on to describe how one should examine them as 
follows: “One must conduct an examination about [a principle] not only on the basis of the 
conclusion and those things out of which an argument is constructed, but also from that which is 
said about the principle; for all the underlying facts harmonize with a truth, while the truth 
quickly clashes with a falsehood” (1098b9–12). 
41 Cf. Parmenides 135c5–136c8 where Plato has Parmenides describe the task of systematically 
applying the method of exploring both sides on a wide range of principles. 
42 Thus my understanding is in line with Allan Bäck’s general contention in “Aristotle’s 
Discovery of First Principles” that Aristotle should be interpreted as a fallibilist, willing to make 
constant adjustments based on explanatory considerations. It is also consistent with Bolton’s 
view that one use of dialectic for Aristotle is to test candidate principles based on their 
consistency with widely-held perceptual data (though keeping open the possibility of corrections 
based on further empirical evidence). See especially Bolton’s “The Epistemological Basis of 
Aristotelian Dialectic.” 
43 Bronstein stresses how explanatory considerations play a role in how we come to understand 
principles according to Aristotle (Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning, 57, 79, 123, 198, 241). 
Exploring both sides involves such considerations within a single application, but these will also 
come into play when comparing candidate principles already known to be true for their relative 
priority. On my view, the meta-principles in Met. Β effectively rule out candidates that would not 
fit explanatory requirements for being first. 
44 Many thanks to Huw Duffy, Marc Gasser-Wingate, Colin King, Emily Kress, and Marko 
Malink for helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper, and especially to Katy Meadows 
and two anonymous reviewers for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. Special thanks as 
well to the organizers and attendees of the 2017 conference on Dialectic and Analytics in the 
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Aristotelian Tradition at Providence College for a number of productive conversations on this 
and related topics. 
